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AttitudeFor decades, person perception research has grappled with the distinction between the targets’ actual
characteristics (‘‘substance’’) and how positively or negatively those characteristics are viewed by per-
ceivers (‘‘evaluation’’); however, lack of an overarching theoretical framework makes it difﬁcult to estab-
lish connections between related lines of research. We review the relevant literature, and present and test
an algebraic model that incorporates the major insights from that literature. The model posits that all
person judgments reﬂect substance and evaluation to different extents. The evaluation component
reﬂects an interaction between the item’s evaluative tone and the perceiver’s evaluative attitude regard-
ing the target person. The model may function as an integrative framework that helps improve concep-
tual clarity and cumulative progress in person perception research.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Psychological research into the ‘‘substantive’’ versus the ‘‘evalu-
ative’’ components of individual’s judgments of themselves and
others has been ongoing for decades, and continues to this day.
McCrae and Costa (1983) used the terms ‘‘substance’’ and ‘‘style’’
to distinguish between what is actually there (substance) and how
it is seen or presented (style). In their nomenclature, style is about
the positive or negative ‘‘spin’’ that the person who delivers the
judgment gives to the naked facts (substance) about the target’s
personality. Presumably, most person descriptions incorporate
both components to some extent. However, in this paper we will
use the term ‘‘evaluation’’ instead of ‘‘style’’ because the latter term
also encompasses inﬂuences on person perception that, while
independent of substance, go beyond broad positive or negative
connotations (e.g., a given perceiver’s tendency to see people as
being trustworthy in particular). The present paper focuses exclu-
sively on those kinds of style that cast a positive or negative light
on targets.
Despite the long history of person perception research, there is
still no comprehensive theoretical framework that incorporates the
distinction between substance and evaluation. This is very unfortu-
nate, because it makes it difﬁcult to directly compare the research
paradigms and ﬁndings from different studies. In the presentpaper, we outline such a framework. As our goal is maximum
exactness and parsimony, we present the model in an algebraic
format. Using an empirical data set, we then test some of the mod-
el’s core predictions, and draw the reader’s attention to some of its
most important implications (e.g., that inter-rater agreement and
scale consistency may be high even if the items that are used do
not reﬂect any actual target characteristics at all).
Most research in this ﬁeld has been based on the (tacit) notion
that substance and evaluation are independent of each other; that
is, the very same ‘‘facts’’ about a person may be presented with
very different evaluative ‘‘tones’’ (Peabody, 1967; Saucier, 1994).
Although it is seldom explicitly acknowledged, the basic philo-
sophical position seems to be, ﬁrst, that there are characteristics
that actually exist in the targets, irrespective of the perceiver.
These are the substance. And, second, each perceiver may have a
more lenient or stern view of the targets, irrespective of their
actual characteristics. This is evaluation. Throughout the paper,
we will adopt the assumption that substance and evaluation are
independent of one another; however, in the discussion section
we will broaden the scope somewhat, and address the possibility
that substance and evaluation might be related.
The third important factor – apart from the truth that resides in
the target and the positive or negative attitude toward the target
that resides in the perceiver – is the extent to which a given item
reﬂects the perceiver’s attitude. According to our knowledge,
Edwards (1953) was the ﬁrst to introduce the idea that items of
personality questionnaires differ systematically in how much of a
positive or negative evaluation of a target person they entail when
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personality questionnaire items correlated very strongly with the
average endorsement rates of the items (i.e., the average person
attributes positive and does not attribute negative characteristics
to himself or herself). Anderson (1968) demonstrated that the
social desirability of natural person-descriptive terms could be
assessed with very good inter-rater reliability, and that the distri-
bution of item desirability ratings was bi-modal – that is, most per-
son-descriptive terms from the natural language have a clear
positive or negative connotation. This ﬁnding was later replicated
for a different sample of English terms by Dumas, Johnson, and
Lynch (2002) and for a sample of German terms by Leising,
Ostrovski, and Borkenau (2012). Therefore, most of the terms that
we use to describe ourselves and others in everyday life are
evaluative.
It follows that the perceiver’s evaluative attitude toward a tar-
get should predict whether he or she will use positive or negative
terms to describe that target. For example, even though the aver-
age person tends to endorse positive and not endorse negative
items in self-descriptions (see above), there are considerable
inter-individual differences in that regard. A person’s overall self-
evaluations may range from very negative to very positive (Bono
& Judge, 2003; Furr & Funder, 1998; Judge, Erez, Bono, &
Thoresen, 2002; Leising et al., 2013), and the evaluative tones of
items should determine the extent to which such differences inﬂu-
ence the person’s self-ratings. In other words, the evaluative tone
of an item may be expected to interact with the perceiver’s evalu-
ative attitude regarding the target (e.g., him- or herself)
(Bäckström, Björklund, & Larsson, 2009; Leising & Borkenau,
2011; McCrae & Costa, 1983). This interaction between the per-
ceiver’s evaluative attitude regarding the target and the evaluative
tone of the item is one of the key ingredients of the model that we
present below. Note that the same logic applies to self-ratings and
other-ratings: A perceiver who has a positive (negative) attitude
toward another person should endorse positive (negative) items
in describing that person, and the same should be true of a person
who likes (dislikes) and describes himself or herself. In the latter
case, the perceiver simply happens to be identical with the target.
It is important to note that, when we speak of the perceiver’s
evaluative attitude, we mean an attitude that already existed
before the current judgment takes place. This needs to be empha-
sized in order to clarify that we do not address impression forma-
tion regarding new targets about which the perceiver knows
nothing yet. A whole body of literature deals with the formation
of (e.g.) approach and avoidance tendencies regarding new stimuli,
but this is not our subject in the present paper. Rather, we deal
with descriptions of targets toward whom the perceiver already
has a ﬁrmly established evaluative attitude.
A series of studies recently corroborated the notion of an inter-
action between evaluative item and perceiver characteristics in
person judgments. Borkenau and Zaltauskas (2009) found that par-
ticipants with higher self-esteem (i.e., participants who liked them-
selves more) described themselves in more ‘‘normative’’ ways, that
is, they endorsed items to the extent that they were endorsed by
the participant sample on average. Because such normative ratings
tend to be extremely similar to ‘‘ideal’’ ratings (Edwards, 1953), the
participants’ responses could be predicted by an interaction of how
much they liked themselves (self-esteem, evaluative attitude) and
evaluative item tone. Leising, Erbs, and Fritz (2010) showed that
rated item desirability moderates the extent to which other-ratings
of personality may be predicted from howmuch the perceivers like
the targets: The extent to which the perceivers’ liking for the tar-
gets predicts the perceivers’ ratings of the targets on a personality
item strongly depends on how much the item entails a positive or
negative evaluation. Notably, such associations persist when per-
ceivers with different evaluative attitudes describe the exact sametargets (Leising, Ostrovski, & Zimmermann, 2013), and even when
perceivers with different evaluative attitudes describe the exact
same behaviors of the exact same targets (Leising, Gallrein, &
Dufner, 2014). These studies provide support for the notion that
the perceivers’ evaluative attitudes inﬂuence person judgments
at least partly independent of the targets’ actual characteristics.
Notably, if judgments of targets by perceivers are affected by an
interaction between the perceivers’ evaluative attitudes and the
items’ evaluative tones, then correlations between judgments
should be affected by these factors as well. One kind of association
between judgments that might be affected is inter-rater agreement.
In a seminal study, John and Robins (1993) hypothesized that more
evaluative (i.e., positive or negative) items should yield lower
inter-rater agreement, and provided evidence for such a curvilinear
relationship using two data sets. A few studies corroborated this
relationship, but other studies did not. A recent meta-analysis
(Kenny & West, 2010) did not support the general notion of a rela-
tionship between item evaluativeness and inter-rater agreement.
Clearly, that relationship is moderated by other factors that are
yet ill-understood. In the present study, we aim to clarify this issue
a bit more.
What is most important in the present context, however, is the
reasoning behind the John and Robins (1993) study: Although it is
not made very explicit in their paper, the expectation that more
evaluative items should yield lower inter-rater agreement seems
to reﬂect the notion that responses to more evaluative items are
more likely to reﬂect differences in the evaluative attitudes that
the different perceivers have toward the targets (e.g., themselves),
and that such differences introduce error variance in computing
inter-rater agreement. This is essentially the idea of an interaction
between item tone and perceiver attitude that we discussed above,
although it was not directly tested in the study by John and Robins
(1993). Our model incorporates that idea, but clariﬁes that inter-
rater agreement may actually be higher for more evaluative items,
if the perceivers’ evaluative attitudes toward the individual targets
are shared.
Inter-rater agreement is usually tested by correlating assess-
ments of the same targets on the same item by different perceivers.
However, the interaction between perceiver attitude and item tone
may also be expected to affect correlations between assessments of
the same targets by the same perceivers on different items; we will
refer to this latter case as ‘‘internal consistency’’. If responses to
evaluative items partly reﬂect the perceivers’ evaluative attitudes
toward the targets, then different evaluative items that are com-
pleted by the same perceivers regarding the same targets should
reﬂect the same evaluative attitudes and thus correlate more
strongly with each other (i.e., the correlation should deviate more
from zero) than more evaluatively neutral items. In other words,
the perceivers’ evaluative attitudes toward the targets could be
conceived of as a common source of variance (= a factor), that
affects responses to items to the extent that the items are evalua-
tive (McCrae & Costa, 1983). Bäckström et al. (2009) provided evi-
dence in favor of this notion, by showing that the ﬁrst factor in
responses to a set of self-report items could be substantially weak-
ened by simply phrasing items less evaluatively. A likely explana-
tion for this ﬁnding is that the perceivers’ self-ratings on the
neutralized items reﬂected their (unchanged) evaluative attitudes
toward themselves to a lesser degree. As a result, the correlations
between the items reﬂected this common source of variance to a
lesser degree, leading to a reduced Eigenvalue in the factor analy-
sis. Our model integrates this line of reasoning as well.
1.1. The model
We will now attempt to formulate an integrative algebraic
framework that incorporates the crucial insights from the
Table 1
Data structure.
Perceiver (p) Targets (t) Item (i) Ypti ti Tti ai Apt Epti
1 1 1 Y111 t1 T11 a1 A11 E111
2 Y121 t1 T21 a1 A12 E121
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
n Y1n1 t1 Tn1 a1 A1n E1n1
2 1 1 Y211 t1 T11 a1 A21 E211
2 Y221 t1 T21 a1 A22 E221
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
n Y2n1 t1 Tn1 a1 A2n E2n1
1 1 2 Y112 t2 T12 a2 A11 E112
2 Y122 t2 T22 a2 A12 E122
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
n Y1n2 t2 Tn2 a2 A1n E1n2
2 1 2 Y212 t2 T12 a2 A21 E212
2 Y222 t2 T22 a2 A22 E222
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
n Y2n2 t2 Tn2 a2 A2n E2n2
Note: Ypti = Perceiver p’s description of the targets on item i. ti = Weight of the tar-
gets’ true scores. Tti = Targets’ true scores. ai = Weight of the perceiver’s evaluative
attitudes. Apt = Perceivers’ evaluative attitudes. Epti = Measurement error.
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low as possible, we focus on item-wise analyses (as opposed to
proﬁle analyses; cf. Furr, 2008), as they represent the most com-
mon approach in person perception research to date. Thus, we will
introduce the model in terms of ratings of many targets (t) by one
perceiver (p) on one item (i).
The basic assumption of the model is that the scores Ypti that a
perceiver (p) assigns to targets (t) on an item (i) reﬂect three inﬂu-
ences, two of which are systematic, and one of which is unsystem-
atic. The ﬁrst systematic component reﬂects some ‘‘substantive’’
quality of the targets, that is, something that is really there, irre-
spective of who does the judgment. We will denote the targets’
true scores Tti, and their weight (the extent to which item i reﬂects
individuals’ true scores) ti. The second systematic component
reﬂects the perceiver’s evaluations of the targets, irrespective of
the targets’ actual personalities. It is represented by the product
of the perceiver’s evaluative attitudes regarding the individual tar-
gets Apt and a weight ai that reﬂects the extent to which item i
reﬂects perceivers’ evaluative attitudes. In line with research ﬁnd-
ings reported above, we assume that this weight is more or less
identical with the evaluative tone of the item. Thus, the perceiver’s
responses to the item Ypti may reﬂect the perceiver’s evaluative
attitudes toward the targets Apt only if the item entails at least
some positive or negative evaluation (ai <> 0). For the time being,
we will assume that perceivers do not differ in how they use items
for expressing their evaluative attitudes toward targets. In the
Discussion, however, we will brieﬂy address the possibility that
the evaluative tones of items may be different for different per-
ceivers. The third component in the model is measurement error
Epti. The ratings of a set of targets by a perceiver on an item may
thus be decomposed as follows:
Ypti ¼ ti  Tti þ ai  Apt þ Epti
Obviously, our model equals the basic formula of classical test
theory, complemented by the interaction between perceiver atti-
tudes Apt and item tone ai, plus a weight ti for the true scores.
Introducing the latter has the important conceptual implication
that some items may measure no real quality of targets at all
(ti = 0). It should be noted that, other than in classical test theory,
we do not assume that the targets’ true scores may only be
obtained by averaging across an inﬁnite number of repeated
assessments (assuming no evaluation for the time being). Rather,
our model is more general than that, because true scores may be
deﬁned at will. For example, a researcher may decide that the
results of some intelligence test constitute a suitable true score
variable for modeling individuals’ ratings of one another on the
item ‘‘smart’’. In this case, ti would simply be the extent to which
the ratings reﬂect the test scores, as measured by (e.g.) a multiple
regression weight (cf. West & Kenny, 2011).
Our model makes explicit how items may reﬂect both (a) high
or low levels of an actual trait and (b) positive or negative ‘‘presen-
tations’’ of that trait. This is exactly the distinction motivating
Peabody’s (1967) work using sets of four items to capture the four
possible combinations of trait level and evaluation. For example,
consider the following set of four adjectives (cf. Borkenau &
Ostendorf, 1989): The adjective pair ‘‘ﬁrm’’ and ‘‘severe’’ is similar
in regard to substance, but dissimilar in regard to evaluation. In
terms our model, if ‘‘ﬁrm’’ and ‘‘severe’’ are items 1 and 2, then
t1 = t2 and a1– a2. That is, they measure (more or less) the same
actual quality of the targets, but item 1 (‘‘ﬁrm’’) measures it with
a positive connotation, whereas item 2 (‘‘severe’’) measures it with
a negative connotation. The same applies to the adjective pair ‘‘le-
nient’’ and ‘‘lax’’. Thus, there is descriptive consistency, but an eval-
uative contrast within each of these adjective pairs. On the other
hand, the adjective pair ‘‘ﬁrm’’ and ‘‘lenient’’ is similar in regard
to evaluation (a1 = a2), but differs in regard to substance (t1– t2),and the same applies to the adjective pair ‘‘severe’’ and ‘‘lax’’.
Peabody (1967), as well as many researchers after him (e.g.,
Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989; Locke & Christensen, 2007; Locke,
Craig, Baik, & Gohil, 2012; Locke, Zheng, & Smith, 2014) used such
adjective pairs to assess individuals’ tendencies to portray them-
selves positively (or negatively) at the cost of providing descrip-
tively inconsistent self-portrayals at the same time. Note that
whereas in previous work the truth and attitude weights were
implicitly assumed to be dichotomous (high/low), they may vary
continuously in our model.
In the following, we will concentrate on how the model may be
applied to associations between measurements. Table 1 displays
the data structure that is relevant for the subsequent presentation.
The most basic case (re-test) in which a measurement (Ypti) is sim-
ply correlated with another (later) measurement of the exact same
kind (Ypti0) will not be considered further. Rather, we will concen-
trate on two cases of particular theoretical and practical impor-
tance. The ﬁrst of these is internal consistency, where the same
targets are assessed by the same perceiver on two different items.
For example, Prudence (perceiver 1) may judge a set of targets (t)
in terms of how intelligent (item 1) and how jovial (item 2) they
are. In Table 1, the correlation between the measurements in rows
1 and 3, and the correlation between the measurements in rows 2
and 4, reﬂect the case of internal consistency. The second case is
inter-rater agreement, where the same targets are judged on the
same item by two different perceivers. For example, Prudence (per-
ceiver 1) and Paul (perceiver 2) may judge a set of targets (t) in
terms of how intelligent (item 1) they are. In Table 1, the correla-
tion between the measurements in rows 1 and 2, and the correla-
tion between the measurements in rows 3 and 4, reﬂect the case of
inter-rater agreement.
The model formula will now be applied to these different kinds
of correlations between measures. The crucial issue is that one core
source of variance (Tti) is between-targets whereas another core
source of variance (Apt) is between-perceivers, and a third core
source of variance (ti, ai) is between-items. This leads to speciﬁc
predictions regarding the different kinds of associations between
measures, depending ﬁrst and foremost on which sources of vari-
ance the different measures share. In our empirical analyses, the
targets are always the same persons, because we use so called
‘‘item-wise’’ correlations (see below). It may still matter, however,
whether the perceivers or the items are the same or not. As the
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perceivers’ evaluative attitudes toward the targets (Apt) and the
evaluative tone of the item (ai), we will focus on the inﬂuence of
these variables, independent of substance: For example, we ask
whether measures may correlate strongly with each other
(between perceivers, or between items), even though they do not
assess the same actual qualities of the targets.Table 2
Linear mixed-effect model analysis: Predicting observed scores on an item.
Model I Model II
Beta SE Stand.
Beta
Beta SE Stand.
Beta
Fixed effects
Intercept 0.060 0.088 0.010 0.031
Tti 0.815*** 0.022 .536 0.813*** 0.023 .536
Apt 0.039 0.042 .036 0.015 0.014 .036
SocDesi 0.279*** 0.019 .306
SocDesi  Tti 0.003 0.014 .003
SocDesi  Apt 0.134*** 0.009 .196
Random effects
r2p 0.016 0.016
r2i 0.230 0.026
r2i(T) 0.014 0.014
r2i(A) 0.053 0.006
r2e 0.799 0.799
Note: N = 80,114. Tti = Targets’ true scores on the item. Apt = Perceivers’ evaluative
attitudes toward targets (liking). r2p = Random effect for perceiver (acquiescence).
r2i = Random effect for item (base rate). r2i(T) = Random effect for inﬂuence of
targets’ true scores on observed scores. r2i(A) = Random effect for inﬂuence of per-
ceivers’ evaluative attitudes on observed scores. r2e = Error variance. Random
covariances are omitted in this table.
*** p < .001.2. Testing the model
We tested the model using a data set from a study by Leising
et al. (2013). In contrast to that study, which analyzed ‘‘proﬁle cor-
relations’’ (cf. Furr, 2008), we used the data for analyses of ‘‘item-
wise correlations’’. That is, the ratings of all perceivers on all items
concerned the same set of target persons. In the Leising et al.
(2013) study, the perceivers were asked to report how much they
liked each target. This variable (Liking) was used to operationalize
the perceivers’ evaluative attitudes toward the targets (Apt) in the
present study.
2.1. Sample
A convenience sample of 209 research volunteers (120 female,
87 male, 2 unreported) participated in the study. Their mean age
was 23.1 years (SD = 4.2). Most participants were university stu-
dents; accordingly, the average level of education in the sample
was high.
2.2. Procedure
The participants were asked to describe each of 15 target per-
sons. The 15 target persons were public ﬁgures. They had been
selected from a larger pool of 50 targets according to the criteria
of (a) being known to many people, (b) differing in their apparent
personalities, and (c) evoking a large within-target variance in
Liking between perceivers. We used public ﬁgures as targets in
order to be able to obtain a large sample of perceivers who could
judge them. By using the same sample of targets for all judgments,
we intended to keep the ‘‘substance’’ component constant across
judgments: If all judgments refer to the same set of targets, differ-
ences between judgments (of the same targets on the same items)
may not be attributed to actual personality differences between
the targets. Given that the targets in the present study were public
ﬁgures, we assumed that the perceivers would have access to lar-
gely the same information about the targets.
Ratings were provided in an online format. The participants
used a list of 30 adjectives (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1998) that
assess the Big Five personality factors by 6 items each (response
options ranging from 1 = ‘‘doesn’t ﬁt at all’’ to 5 = ‘‘ﬁts perfectly’’).
We excluded ratings with either more than 2 missing values (i.e.,
fewer than 28 items used to describe the target) or more than 25
items with equal values (suggesting careless responding). We also
excluded perceivers who had judged fewer than 12 of the 15 tar-
gets. The perceivers were asked to report how much they liked
each of the 15 targets (using a 5-point scale ranging from
1 = ‘‘not at all’’ to 5 = ‘‘very much’’). This information was used to
operationalize the evaluative attitude (Apt) component of our
model. Ratings of targets for whom liking was not reported were
also excluded. Altogether, we analyzed 2673 ratings of 12 or more
targets by 189 perceivers. In a previous study (Leising et al., 2010),
the 30 items had been rated for their social desirability with very
good inter-rater reliability (ICC(3,24) = .98). We used these ratings
in the present study, suspecting that rated desirability would be
strongly associated with the empirically determined attitude
weights (ai).2.3. Application of the basic model formula
For computing the targets’ true scores (Tti) on the 30 items, we
ﬁrst averaged – separately for each target – the ratings that the tar-
get had received from all perceivers who had reported liking him/
her to the same extent. These average ratings were then averaged
across the ﬁve Liking levels – still separately for each target –
which resulted in (15 targets  30 items =) 450 true scores that
were balanced for Liking (i.e., they represented an average of 5
average perceivers with different liking levels, giving each Liking
level the same weight).
We simultaneously predicted the observed scores (Ypti) from the
target’s true scores (Tti) and from the perceivers’ attitudes (Apt),
using a linear mixed-effect model. In this model, we also included
four random coefﬁcients: A random intercept for perceivers (taking
into account that perceivers may differ in their tendency to
endorse any item [‘‘acquiescence’’]), a random intercept for items
(taking into account that items may differ in base rates), and two
random slopes for the inﬂuence of Tti and Apt across items (taking
into account that items may differ in how strongly true scores
and perceiver attitudes affect the observed scores). The two ran-
dom slopes are conceptually equivalent to ti and ai in our model
outlined above, and the estimated values for each item were saved
for use in later analyses. All variables were centered at their theo-
retical mean (i.e., Ypti, Tti, and Apt now varied from 2 to 2).
The results of this analysis (‘‘Model I’’) are displayed in
Table 2. Observed scores were strongly inﬂuenced by true scores
(Beta = 0.82, p < .001), but not by perceivers’ attitudes (Beta = 0.04,
p = .36). However, analyses of random slopes indicated that the
inﬂuence of the perceivers’ attitudes varied much more strongly
across items (r2i(A) = 0.053) than did the inﬂuence of the targets’
true scores (r2i(T) = 0.014). We suspected that the different extents
to which the items reﬂected the perceivers’ attitudes toward the
targets should be closely mirrored by ratings of the items’ social
desirability (cf. Leising et al., 2014), and we provide a test of this
hypothesis below. The extents to which the items reﬂected truth
and attitudes (i.e., the two random slope variables) were largely
uncorrelated (r = .11) across items, which is in line with the most
common conceptualizations of the relationship between substance
and evaluation (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1983; Peabody, 1967). In addi-
tion, analyses of random intercepts showed that variance in
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rates (r2i = 0.230) than to perceiver differences in acquiescence
(r2p = 0.016).
In the next step (‘‘Model II’’, see Table 2), we added the social
desirability ratings of the 30 items as additional predictors, includ-
ing their two-way interactions with Tti and Apt. Analyses of ﬁxed
effects suggested that observed scores were still strongly predicted
by true scores (Beta = 0.81, p < .001), but also by the social desir-
ability of the item (Beta = 0.28, p < .001), and an interaction of the
item’s social desirability and the perceiver’s attitude (Beta = 0.13,
p < .001). The main effect of item desirability implies that the per-
ceivers were inclined to endorse items the more the items had a
positive connotation. Note that this effect is not part of our model,
and will be ignored in our analyses of item-wise agreement
between measures because correlations are unaffected by mean
differences between variables.
Fig. 1 displays simple slopes resulting from this analysis. In line
with our theoretical model, the attitudes of the perceivers toward
the targets only inﬂuenced observed scores when the item entailed
a positive or negative evaluation. Ceteris paribus, a perceiver who
likes a target very much (Apt = 2) would be expected to score
roughly 1 point higher (assuming a 5-point scale) on a socially
desirable item (desirability = 2) than a perceiver who does not like
the target at all (Apt = 2). For a socially undesirable item (desir-
ability = 2), a perceiver who likes a target very much (Apt = 2)
would be expected to score roughly one point lower than a per-
ceiver who does not like the target at all (Apt = 2). For a neutral
item (desirability = 0), perceiver attitudes toward targets would
not be expected to affect observed scores.
Notably, whereas perceivers with neutral attitudes (Apt = 0)
would be expected to assign higher scores with increasing social
desirability of the item, (see above), they would not be expected
to consider the item’s social desirability much when rating targets
they do not like (Apt = 2). This ﬁnding may seem strange at ﬁrst,
because one could imagine that perceivers with negative attitudes
tend to ascribe negative, and not to ascribe positive characteristics
to their targets. However, that seems not to be the case. Rather, at
the lower end of the liking continuum the perceivers’ normativeFig. 1. Simples slopes resulting from the test of the basic model formula: Only evaluative
perceiver attitudes (predictor, x) on personality ratings (criterion, y) is moderated by t
attitudes yield higher ratings on socially desirable items, and lower ratings on socially u
evaluatively neutral items. Very negative perceiver attitudes do not yield different ratin
effect, with the roles of predictor (item desirability, x) and moderator (perceiver attitudassumption that targets have more positive than negative charac-
teristics seems to get lost.
Finally, analyses of random effects indicated that the variance in
item intercepts (r2i = 0.026) and in the inﬂuence of perceiver atti-
tudes across items (r2i(A) = 0.006) was reduced by almost 90%
when entering ratings of item desirability into the model. This sug-
gests that differences in rated social desirability between items
accounted for this variance. In contrast, variance in perceiver inter-
cepts (r2p = 0.016) and in the inﬂuence of true scores across items
(r2i(T) = 0.014) remained the same. We also repeated all of these
analyses incorporating target-speciﬁc liking (averaged across per-
ceivers) as an additional predictor, but the results remained virtu-
ally unchanged.
2.4. Predicting correlations between measurements: Internal
consistency
We will now discuss the implications of our model for correla-
tions between measurements. Fig. 2 depicts the case of internal
consistency. For the sake of simplicity, we will abbreviate the cor-
relation between two measures rYY. In the case of internal consis-
tency, rYY is the association between two ratings of the same
targets by the same perceiver on two different items (Ypti, Yptj).
That is, we study how various combinations of two items (e.g.,
friendly-intelligent; intelligent-lazy; lazy-attractive, etc.) on which
the same perceiver describes a set of targets correlate with one
another. Note that Fig. 2 only displays the model for one particular
pair of items. The overall analysis of how rYY depends on variations
in ai, ti, Apt and Tti comprises (189 ⁄ 30 ⁄ 29/2=) 82,215 such cases
(because each of the 30 items is correlated with every other item,
and this is done for each of the 189 perceivers; however, there
were some missing values).
As evident from Fig. 2, our model predicts that, in the case of
internal consistency, rYY should depend on two inﬂuences in partic-
ular: One is the three-way interaction between the true score cor-
relation (rTT) between Tti and Ttj on the one hand, and the product
of ti and tj on the other hand. That is, the more each of the two
items reﬂects something that is real (ti, tj), and the more those realitems reﬂect perceiver attitudes. The left image shows how the effect of evaluative
he social desirability of the respective item (three lines): More positive perceiver
ndesirable items. In contrast, perceiver attitudes do not affect observed scores for
gs on items differing in social desirability. The right image shows the exact same
e) reversed.
Fig. 2. Model for predicting the internal consistency (rYY) of two items (i, j) that are
used by the same perceiver (p) for describing the same targets (t). Apart from
measurement error, the correlation rYY between the two measurements (Ypti, Yptj)
should depend on the extent to which both items assess the perceiver’s evaluative
attitudes Apt. This extent is the product of ai and aj. The correlation between the two
measurements should also depend on the interaction between the correlation rTT of
the targets’ true scores on the two items (Tti, Ttj) and the extent to which both items
reﬂect those true scores. The latter is the product of ti and tj.
Table 3
Linear mixed-effect model analysis: Predicting internal consistency (i.e., the corre-
lation between two items by which the same perceiver describes the same set of
targets).
Beta SEjack Stand. Beta
Intercept 0.003* 0.001
rTT 0.387*** 0.009 .415
ti 0.014* 0.006 .004
tj 0.014* 0.006 .004
ai 0.075*** 0.007 .044
aj 0.075*** 0.007 .044
rTT  ti 0.209*** 0.032 .025
rTT  tj 0.209*** 0.032 .025
ti  tj 0.092 0.057 .003
ai  aj 2.152*** 0.111 .288
rTT  ti  tj 1.672*** 0.277 .022
Note: N = 81,562 ⁄ 2 (double entry method). rTT = Correlation between the targets’
true scores on the two items (i, j). ti = inﬂuence of targets’ true scores on observed
scores on item i. tj = inﬂuence of targets’ true scores on observed scores on item j.
ai = inﬂuence of perceivers’ evaluative attitudes on observed scores on item i.
aj = inﬂuence of perceivers’ evaluative attitudes on observed scores on item j. Effects
describe inﬂuences of (combinations of) variables when all other variables equal
their own individual averages (i.e., a = 0.04, t = 0.82, and rTT = 0.02). Standard
errors (SE) and p-values are based on the Jackknife method. Random effects are
omitted in this table. Standardized betas were computed on the basis of variables
that were z-transformed in the long data format.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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two measures (rYY) should be. The other likely inﬂuence is the two-
way interaction of ai and aj: The more the two measures reﬂect the
perceiver’s attitudes toward the individual targets in the same way
(e.g., positively), the more the internal consistency of the two mea-
sures should increase. If one item reﬂects the perceiver’s attitudes
positively (e.g., ‘‘bright’’) and the other item reﬂects the perceiver’s
attitudes negatively (e.g., ‘‘smartass’’), the correlation between the
two items should decrease and possibly even become negative.
To test whether these two predictions are valid we ran a linear
mixed-effect model analysis. Note that we used the ‘‘double entry’’
method, i.e., each combination of items was included twice.1 We
did so in order to account for the fact that each item could arbitrarily
be assigned the role of item i or item j within each item pair (i.e.,
items were indistinguishable; cf. Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). We
predicted the observed correlation rYY from the true score correlation
rTT, the truth weights ti and tj, their two-way and three-way interac-
tions, as well as the attitude weights ai and aj and their two-way
interaction. The ai, aj, ti and tj weights we used in this analysis were
the ones that had been estimated as random slopes in the ﬁrst round
of analyses described above. In addition, we included random inter-
cepts for perceivers and items, allowing for the possibility that some
perceivers tend to provide more (or less) similar judgments on dif-
ferent items than the average perceiver does, and that items may dif-
fer in how well they converge with other items, on average. All
variables were centered prior to analysis.
The results of the analysis suggested that the observed correla-
tion between two items depends on two inﬂuences in particular,
as evidenced by comparisons of standardized effect sizes (see
Table 3): The correlation between the targets’ true scores
(Beta = .39) and the interaction between the items’ attitude weights
(Beta = 2.15). The fact that, in this analysis, rYYwas predictable from
the true score correlation rather than the three-way interaction1 In these analyses, we relied on a jackknife resampling procedure to test whether
the ﬁxed effects were statistically signiﬁcant (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). This was
necessary because of numerous non-independencies in the data. Speciﬁcally, we
computed the respective coefﬁcients (N=) 189 times, each time omitting the data
from exactly one of the 189 perceivers. The distribution of coefﬁcients across these
189 resamples was then used to estimate standard errors, which were then used to
derive p-values. In a previous publication, we presented evidence from a Monte Carlo
simulation study showing that jackknife based p-values are sufﬁciently accurate for
data structures such as ours (Leising et al., 2013).between ti, tj and rTT contradicted our expectations. However, we
think that this ﬁndingmay be explained in terms of (a) how the true
scores were obtained in the present study and (b) the resulting
empirical range of ti and tj. We obtained the targets’ true scores
by averaging observed scores across perceivers (balanced for lik-
ing). Then we used these true scores to predict the observed scores,
and thereby obtained the true score weights ti. In order for rTT to be
high, both ti and tj thus had to be relatively high as well. As a con-
sequence, the product of ti and tj could not add much information
beyond the true score correlation rTT. The second possible reason
for the unexpected ﬁnding in regard to the inﬂuence of ti ⁄ tj ⁄ rTT
is the relatively low variance of ti and tj in our dataset (range:
0.57–1.02), limiting the possibility for the three-way interaction
to deviate markedly from the true score correlation rTT. It should
be noted, however, that both of these restrictions (a and b) do not
have to apply to other datasets. If ‘‘true scores’’ were rationally cho-
sen, rather than computed as averages of the measurements that
are to be predicted, rTT could easily be high while ti, tj, or both are
close to zero (and vice versa). Consider the following two cases
(each could be displayed in the format of Fig. 2): In the ﬁrst hypo-
thetical case, we use the results of a vocabulary test as the true
score variable for the item ‘‘articulate’’, and the results of a general
intelligence test as the true score variable for the item ‘‘beautiful’’
(!). In this case, the two true score variables would probably be clo-
sely associated, but the three way interaction between rTT, ti, and tj
would be close to zero, because general intelligence is not a very
good predictor of rated beauty (i.e., the true score weight for this
item would be very low). In the second case, we only replace the
item ‘‘beautiful’’ by ‘‘smart’’. This time, the three-way interaction
should be much higher. If we used only these two cases in our anal-
ysis described above, we would ﬁnd that the three-way interaction,
rather than the true score correlation alone, predicts the observed
correlation between two items.
In regard to the factors that contribute to internal consistency,
the role of the attitude weight product is particularly remarkable:
It implies that we will be able to partly predict the correlation
between two items simply from knowing how much they both
entail positive or negative evaluations of targets. This effect was
relatively strong: For example, if both ai and aj equal .30 then the
Table 4
Linear mixed-effect model analysis: Predicting inter-rater agreement (i.e., the
correlation between ratings of the same set of targets on an item by two different
perceivers).
Beta SEjack Stand. Beta
Intercept 0.224*** 0.025
ti 0.467*** 0.033 .174
ti
2 0.626*** 0.160 .026
ai 0.031* 0.015 .024
rAA 0.007 0.006 .007
ai
2 0.483*** 0.095 .084
ai  rAA 0.082*** 0.020 .019
ai
2  rAA 1.050*** 0.125 .055
Note: N = 527,592 ⁄ 2 (double entry method). rAA = Correlation between the two
perceivers’ (p, q) evaluative attitudes toward the targets. ti = inﬂuence of targets’
true scores on observed scores on item i. ai = inﬂuence of perceivers’ evaluative
attitudes on observed scores on item i. Effects describe inﬂuences of (combinations
of) variables when all other variables equal their own individual averages (i.e.,
a = 0.04, t = 0.82, and rApAq = 0.12). Standard errors (SE) and p-values are based on
the Jackknife method. Random effects are omitted in this table. Standardized betas
were computed on the basis of variables that were z-transformed in the long data
format.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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by (0.30 ⁄ 0.075 + 0.30 ⁄ 0.075 + 0.30 ⁄ 0.30 ⁄ 2.152=) 0.24, control-
ling for substance. This is highly relevant to the debate over the so-
called ‘‘general factor of personality’’ (see below). It should be
noted, however, that the product of ai and aj may only affect inter-
nal consistency if the attitudes of the perceiver regarding the indi-
vidual targets differ from one another. Table 3 also includes a
number of additional signiﬁcant effects that were not predicted
by our model. As these were considerably smaller than the ones
discussed above, for simplicity we will ignore them here.
2.5. Predicting correlations between measurements: Inter-rater
agreement
In the context of our study, inter-rater agreement was opera-
tionalized as the correlation between judgments by two perceivers
(p, q) who used the same item (i) for judging the same set of targets
(t). For example, Priscilla and Quinn may judge the intelligence of a
set of targets. Fig. 3 displays such a constellation in abstract form.
Note again that the ﬁgure only incorporates two perceivers and
one item, whereas the full analysis we present below incorporates
hundreds of such constellations. According to our model, we would
expect inter-rater agreement (rYY) to be predictable from two inﬂu-
ences in particular: The ﬁrst is the extent to which the item mea-
sures some real quality of the targets, ti2. The fact that the square of
ti rather than ti is relevant here implies that inter-rater agreement
will improve the more the correlation between the true scores Tti
and both of the measured variables (Ypti and Yqti) deviates from
zero (in either direction). The second relevant predictor is the inter-
action between the correlation of the perceivers’ evaluative atti-
tudes toward the targets (rAA) and the (squared) extent to which
the item reﬂects these attitudes (ai): The more two perceivers tend
to favor the same targets over other targets, and the more the item
reﬂects such preferences, the more their agreement in judging the
targets on the item should be inﬂated. The fact that the square of ai
rather than ai is relevant here implies that it does not matter
whether the item has a positive or negative evaluative connotation.
To the extent that the perceivers’ evaluative attitudes toward the
targets are shared, inter-rater agreement will be improved the
more the item is evaluative (i.e., ai <> 0).Fig. 3. Model for predicting inter-rater agreement (rYY) between two perceivers (p,
q) that use the same item (i) for describing the same targets (t). Apart from
measurement error, the correlation rYY between the two measurements (Ypti, Yqti)
should depend on the extent ti2 to which the item assesses the targets true scores,
regardless of the direction of that association. The correlation between the two
measurements should also depend on the interaction between the correlation rAA of
the perceiver’s evaluative attitudes toward the targets (Apt, Aqt), and the extent ai2 to
which the item reﬂects those attitudes, regardless of the direction of that
association.We tested our predictions using linear mixed-effect model anal-
ysis. For this analysis, we ﬁrst computed all correlations for judg-
ments of the targets by the (189 ⁄ 188/2=) 17,766 pairs of
individual perceivers for each of the 30 items. The resulting corre-
lations were entered into the model as the dependent variable, and
predicted from variations in the truth weight ti and its square, as
well as the attitude correlation rAA, the attitude weight ai and its
square, and the two-way interactions between attitude correlation
and the (squared) attitude weight. Again, we used the double entry
method, included random intercepts for perceivers and items, and
centered all variables prior to analysis.
The analysis (see Table 4) yielded a signiﬁcant intercept of .22
which is very close to an estimator of average consensus reported
by Kenny (2004; cf. Kenny, Albright, Malloy, & Kashy, 1994). The
analysis also yielded a signiﬁcant standardized Beta of .17 for the
weight of the true scores, which was the strongest effect of any
of the predictors. Therefore, inter-rater agreement will in fact be
higher the more the respective item reﬂects something that is real.
In our dataset, the squared true score weight could not add much to
the prediction because – due to our method of obtaining true
scores – all true score weights were positive. However, in other
datasets, true score weights might well be negative, depending
on which variables are selected as the true scores. Thus, our predic-
tion that the squared true score weight is the relevant predictor
applies to the more general case. As predicted, we also found a sig-
niﬁcant standardized Beta (.06) for the interaction between the
squared attitude weight ai2 and the attitude correlation rAA.
Therefore, inter-rater agreement was in fact higher the more the
item assessed evaluative attitudes and the perceivers’ evaluative
attitudes regarding the individual targets converged. In addition,
the squared attitude weight also made a strong independent pre-
diction by itself (.08), which was not predicted by our model. We
think this effect may be explained in terms of the average attitude
correlation (r = 0.12) in the present data set (i.e., inter-rater agree-
ment was higher for more evaluative items, because the perceivers
tended to agree with one another in regard to howmuch they liked
the individual targets).3. Discussion
We presented an algebraic model that incorporates the major
insights from the research literature on ‘‘substance’’ and
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demonstrate how various strands of research on these matters may
basically be traced back to the same simple idea. By explicating
and formalizing that idea for the ﬁrst time, we hope to improve
conceptual and computational clarity in this ﬁeld, and to enable
a better cumulative integration of research ﬁndings in the future.
Replicating previous research (e.g., Leising et al., 2014), we showed
that the rated social desirability of an item is largely the same as
the extent to which responses to that item are inﬂuenced by the
perceivers’ evaluative attitudes toward the targets (cf. McCrae &
Costa, 1983).
3.1. Internal consistency
One of the major conclusions that may be drawn from our anal-
yses concerns internal consistency: When a perceiver judges tar-
gets on two different items, the correlation between the items
will be partly predictable from the interaction of the items’ evalu-
ative tones alone. That is because an item’s evaluative tone directly
mirrors the extent to which it will reﬂect the perceiver’s evaluative
attitudes toward the targets, and the perceiver’s evaluative atti-
tudes are the same in both assessments (assuming temporal stabil-
ity). This ﬁnding is highly relevant to the controversial debate over
the so-called ‘‘general factor of personality’’ (GFP) (Musek, 2007),
which basically focuses on the question of whether the ﬁrst (sec-
ond-order) factor in factor analyses of Big Five items or scales
reﬂects substance (i.e., there is a very broad personality factor that
distinguishes people with more desirable personality features from
those with less desirable personality features), or style (i.e., the fac-
tor is accounted for by the perceivers’ more positive or negative
attitudes toward the targets). Numerous studies have shown that
a relatively strong common factor exists at the top of the hierarchy
of personality factors (for an overview, see Just, 2011). Often, the
number of studies, the number of measures, or the number of sub-
jects used in these studies is cited as evidence in favor of this fac-
tor’s ‘‘substantial’’ nature. However, our model highlights the
possibility that – despite high numbers of studies, measures, and
subjects – this factor may still be at least partly accounted for by
the respective perceivers’ evaluative attitudes toward the targets.
As long as all data in a study come from the same source (most
studies used self-report measures exclusively), substance and eval-
uation may not be distinguished from one another. Several studies
show that, once person descriptions are obtained across different
sources (e.g., self versus peer-ratings), the general factor of person-
ality is at least substantially weakened (e.g., Danay & Ziegler,
2011; Riemann & Kandler, 2010). This, however, does not imply
that the attitude variance in personality ratings is meaningless or
irrelevant. For example, a tendency to view oneself more positively
or negatively may be highly consequential for an individual’s life,
as it may determine which challenges a person is willing to take
up. More research is needed to clarify just how much of the general
factor of personality is rooted in attitude variance, what the
remaining variance reﬂects, and how the evaluative and the sub-
stantial components of the general factor relate to each other.
It should be noted that our model is not only applicable to data
structures like the one that we used for illustrative purposes in the
present paper (one perceiver p describes all targets t), but also to
the more general case where p is a group of perceivers (i.e., each
target is described by a different perceiver, but by the same per-
ceiver in both assessments i and j). The only difference would be
that in the ﬁrst case perceiver effects in evaluative attitudes (cf.
Srivastava, Guglielmo, & Beer, 2010; Wood, Harms, & Vazire,
2010) would not play a role (i.e., they would affect a given per-
ceiver’s judgments of all targets equally and thus not affect the cor-
relation rYY), whereas in the second case they would (i.e., they
would increase the internal consistency correlation rYY).Relationship effects in evaluative attitudes (i.e., a given perceiver
favoring some targets over other targets), however, will always
play a role, as long as the items are evaluative: The stronger these
relationship effects, the more internal consistency will increase.
It is important to consider the consequences of these effects in
regard to scale score computation. As is widely known, aggregating
across items tends to improve the reliability of measures, because
the covariances between the systematic components of the indi-
vidual items but not the covariances involving unsystematic error
(which are zero) will contribute to the overall scale score variance.
The question is whether an overall scale score reliably reﬂects sub-
stance or evaluation, because both of these are sources of system-
atic variance. The answer to that question depends on the extent to
which the individual items reﬂect each component. We will dis-
cuss the two most extreme cases conceivable: In the ﬁrst case,
all individual items measure substance (ti <> 0) but no evaluation
(ai = 0), and the substance they measure is the same (rTT = 1).
Under such circumstances, aggregating across items will yield an
increasingly reliable score that only reﬂects true score variance
and error variance. In the second case, all individual items measure
the perceivers’ evaluative attitudes (ai <> 0), but no substance
(ti = 0). In this case, aggregating across items will also yield an
increasingly reliable score, but the score will only reﬂect attitude
variance and error variance. To conclude: A scale may have high
internal consistency even if its items measure no real quality of
targets at all, but only the perceivers’ evaluative attitudes.
3.2. Inter-rater agreement
Another major conclusion that may be drawn from the present
analyses is that inter-rater agreementmay partly be predicted from
the extent to which evaluative attitudes toward the targets are
sharedbetweenperceivers. Thus, ourmodel suggests amajor reﬁne-
ment as compared to previous conceptualizations in which it was
assumed that more evaluative items would always yield lower
inter-rater agreement (e.g., John & Robins, 1993). According to our
model, evaluative items will yield lower inter-rater agreement if
the perceivers’ attitudes regarding the targets are unrelated,
because such attitudes will operate as error variance and dilute
the overall correlation. If the perceivers’ attitudes are negatively
correlated (e.g., Pam prefers male targets and Peter prefers female
targets), the overall correlation between two measures might even
turn out negative. Positively correlated perceiver attitudes on the
other hand might result in higher inter-rater agreement. All of this,
however, will only be the case to the extent that the item actually
reﬂects the perceivers’ evaluative attitudes (ai2).
This insight has important implications in regard to the com-
mon (mis-)interpretation of inter-rater agreement in terms of
validity. If different ratings of the same targets agree with one
another, this is often interpreted as evidence in favor of their valid-
ity. However, whereas it is true that judgments will tend to agree
better with one another the more each judgment is valid, the
reverse is not true (for an empirical demonstration, see
Borkenau, Leising, & Fritz, 2014). In fact, high inter-rater agreement
may be completely based on evaluative attitudes that are shared
between perceivers. For example, if Pam and Peter are completely
unqualiﬁed to infer the intelligence of targets, but both hate men,
their judgments of the intelligence of a group of male and female
targets might still correlate perfectly with one another, given that
‘‘intelligent’’ is one of the most evaluative terms in the natural per-
son-descriptive lexicon (Anderson, 1968; Leising et al., 2012).
3.3. Validity
Even though we did not directly address issues of validity in the
present paper, our model allows for making predictions in that
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personality item (e.g., ‘‘intelligent’’) are used to predict some crite-
rion variable (e.g., intelligence test results) that is supposed to
reﬂect the targets’ actual standings on the respective trait. That cri-
terion variable Yct may also be decomposed in terms of our model.
Note that there is no independent perceiver here (i.e., item and
‘‘perceiver’’ are confounded), which is why we only use two
indices, one for the targets (t) and one for the criterion variable
(c). Ideally, the criterion variable would only reﬂect true score vari-
ance, and probably some measurement error. As a result, validity
would decrease the more the predictor variable contains evaluation
variance (i.e., the more the perceiver’s attitudes toward the targets
differ, and the more the item reﬂects those attitudes), because this
evaluation variance would not be shared between measures, thus
attenuating the overall correlation between them.
It is possible, however, to think of the criterion variable as also
containing an evaluation component, which allows us to address
issues of (e.g.) test fairness: Just like individual perceivers, a test
may have different ‘‘attitudes’’ Act regarding certain types of targets
(e.g., a tendency to advantage or disadvantage men). If we con-
ducted a study of judgmental accuracy, using a sample of per-
ceivers whose evaluative attitudes (Apt) correlate positively with
the bias (Act) of the test that is used as the criterion variable, then
the predictor–criterion correlation would be inﬂated, suggesting
better accuracy but actually reﬂecting only the inﬂuence of shared
bias.
In her Self-Other-Knowledge Asymmetry (SOKA) model, Vazire
(2010) hypothesized that ‘‘others know more than the self about
highly evaluative traits and this asymmetry is reduced or reversed
for evaluatively neutral traits’’ (p. 285). For the case where an unbi-
ased criterion variable is available, our own model allows us to
reﬁne that formulation as follows: For evaluatively neutral traits,
the validity of self- and other-judgments should be relatively sim-
ilar (because individual differences in perceiver attitudes should
not affect either of these judgments). For evaluative traits, the data
source (i.e., self or other) that has the greater attitude variance
should be less valid, because this variance would operate as error
variance, attenuating the predictor–criterion correlation. For
example, if the others (e.g., unacquainted observers) have no rea-
son to prefer some targets over other targets, the attitude variance
in the self-ratings (i.e., self-esteem) is likely to be larger (Furr &
Funder, 1998; Judge et al., 2002), and thus self-ratings may be less
accurate than other-ratings. However, if the sample of others con-
tains individuals whose attitudes regarding their respective targets
differ considerably (e.g., spouses and ex-spouses), the attitude vari-
ance in the other-ratings may be larger than in the self-ratings, and
thus other-ratings may be less accurate than self-ratings.
3.4. Possible extensions of the model
The model we formulated and the applications of the model
that we discussed so far were intentionally kept simple in order
to make the presentation as easy to follow as possible. However,
the model may easily be modiﬁed to incorporate additional factors
featured in the person perception literature. We will now brieﬂy
address some of these.
3.4.1. Decomposing the attitude weight ai
The extent to which an item reﬂects the perceivers’ attitudes ai
may be decomposed into a normative and an individual compo-
nent (cf. Borkenau, Zaltauskas, & Leising, 2009). The normative
component would reﬂect the extent to which an average person
would use the item to express a positive or negative evaluation
of a target. In contrast, the individual component would reﬂect
the extent to which a speciﬁc perceiver would use the item to
express a positive or negative evaluation of a target. By making thisdistinction, it becomes possible that perceivers who have the same
evaluative attitudes toward the same targets may still arrive at dif-
ferent judgments because they differ in how positive or negative a
connotation they think an item has. For example, if Priscilla and
Phoebe are highly – and equally – fond of Todd, but Priscilla thinks
that the word ‘‘smartass’’ is very derogative, whereas Phoebe
thinks that the word is only somewhat derogative, then we would
expect Priscilla to judge Todd as being less of a ‘‘smartass’’, as com-
pared to how Todd is judged by Phoebe. More generally speaking,
we would expect the correlation between judgments to be partly
predictable from how much ai is shared between perceivers. In a
yet unpublished study of ours, we let a convenience sample of 34
research participants (age: M = 29.2, SD = 9.7; 16 female, 13 male,
5 failed to report sex) judge the social desirability of 118 question-
naire items. The rating scale ranged from 1 (‘‘very negative’’) to 10
(‘‘very positive’’). As is common in this type of research, the inter-
nal consistency of the average desirability judgment was close to
perfect, ICC(3,34) = .99. However, agreement between individual
raters was considerably lower, ICC(3,1) = .73. Moreover, men
(M = 5.36, SD = 0.28) judged the items more positively than did
women (M = 5.02, SD = 0.31), t(27) = 3.05, p = .005. Although this
latter ﬁnding may not be generalizable due to the small sample
size and the sampling procedure, we report it here because it sug-
gests that searching for systematic group differences in how items
are evaluated may be a worthwhile endeavor.
3.4.2. Decomposing Apt
In the present paper, we operationalized a perceiver’s evalua-
tive Attitude in terms of how much the perceiver said he or she
liked a target. However, not all of the perceivers’ evaluative atti-
tudes have to be consciously accessible. It would be conceivable
to further decompose Apt into an explicit and an implicit compo-
nent, or into a voluntary (controlled) and an involuntary (auto-
matic) component. For example, Sackeim and Gur (1979)
introduced the important distinction between overly positive
images of the self that the self believes in (self-deception) and
overly positive images of the self that the self knows are inaccurate
(other-deception or impression management; cf. Paulhus, 1984).
One could conceive of Apt as being a weighted sum of these two
inﬂuences. The correlation between two measurements would
then at least partly depend on the extent to which they reﬂect each
of these inﬂuences, and also on the covariations of these inﬂuences
(e.g., self-other agreement would increase if the targets’ uncon-
scious self-deception is ‘‘bought’’ by others).
3.5. Limitations
The present paper clearly has its limitations. First, we used rat-
ings that were averaged across liking levels as our measure of the
targets’ ‘‘true scores’’. Although this approach is conceptually
sound and largely yielded the expected results, it would be prefer-
able to use measures of true scores that are obtained independent
of Ypti (e.g., results of cognitive ability tests). Only under such more
ideal conditions could we expect the three-way interaction
between ti, tj, and rTT to inﬂuence internal consistency, as predicted
by the model. Second, the targets in our empirical present study
were public ﬁgures the perceivers did not have any personal con-
tact with. As most person judgments in everyday life concern per-
sonal acquaintances of the perceivers, this design feature may cast
some doubt on the generalizability of the results. Future research
certainly needs to replicate the main conclusions of the present
study using more naturalistic designs. Third, we used an explicit
assessment of Liking (How much do you like this person?) as our
measure of Apt. In the context of the present study, this seemed jus-
tiﬁable because all participants judged the same set of target per-
sons. However, Liking under less controlled conditions (e.g., where
70 D. Leising et al. / Journal of Research in Personality 57 (2015) 61–71each perceiver judges a different target) probably reﬂects the per-
ceivers’ idiosyncratic evaluative attitudes, as well as the targets’
actual personalities (e.g., in terms of ‘‘likeability’’). In other words,
the perceivers’ liking may be correlated with Tti. This, however,
does not really pose a problem for the model because it is capable
of incorporating correlated predictors (cf. West & Kenny, 2011).
On a side note: Due to the close correspondence between the
item’s evaluative tone and the perceiver’s evaluative attitude, the
extent to which a perceiver endorses positive and does not endorse
negative items in describing a target may be used as an indirect but
relatively accurate measure of the perceiver’s evaluative attitude or
Liking. This is particularly truewhenaggregating acrossmany items,
as is the case when computing proﬁle correlations between item
endorsements and itemdesirabilities for a givenperceiver’s descrip-
tion of a given target. For example, in Leising et al.’s (2013) study,
such proﬁle correlations correlated very strongly (r(3) = .92,
p < .05) with the Liking level (1–5) reported by the respective per-
ceiver (correlation not reported in the original study).3.6. Conclusion
This paper presented an algebraic formulation of some basic
ideas that have permeated the literature on substance and evalua-
tion in person perception for decades. It should be noted that we
by no means claim to have come up with these ideas ourselves.
Rather, the most important conceptual contributions may clearly
be attributed to other authors, such as Edwards (1953), Peabody
(1967), McCrae and Costa (1983), John and Robins (1993) and
Bäckström et al. (2009) (see Introduction). The merit of the present
paper is that it outlines these ideas in a precise mathematical fash-
ion for the ﬁrst time. By providing this outline, we hope to foster
the integration of the various existing strands of research address-
ing issues of substance and evaluation. Such integration has often
been hampered by inconsistent terminology and methodology,
resulting in a vast number of different but overlapping concepts
and ﬁndings that are often hard to comprehensively conciliate.
The algebraic model presented here should be able to help stream-
line the interpretation of the existing body of evidence
considerably.References
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